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Although the expanded corn ethanol and cellulosic biofu-els mandates contained in the 
new Energy Independence and Se-
curity Act (EISA) have generated the 
most headlines, the act’s new biodie-
sel mandates may have a larger 
impact on U.S. agriculture over the 
next few years. Biodiesel use is now 
mandated to grow from 500 million 
gallons in 2009 to one billion gallons 
in 2012. U.S. biodiesel production 
was expected to decline signifi cantly 
over the next few years because of 
low operating margins caused by 
high feedstock costs. The increased 
production due to the mandate will 
put upward pressure on already 
high vegetable oil prices, which in 
turn will further increase the cost of 
producing U.S. biodiesel. 
It is quite likely that the price 
biodiesel producers will need to 
cover their production costs will 
be much greater than the price that 
consumers will be willing to pay. 
Production usually does not occur 
when production costs are greater 
than consumer willingness to pay. 
Some form of government interven-
tion will need to occur to ensure 
that mandated biodiesel use levels 
are met. A review of the current 
situation and medium-term outlook 
facing the biodiesel industry may 
suggest alternative interventions 
that the federal government can 
take to make sure that biodiesel use 
increases to target levels.
Biodiesel Margins
Biodiesel plants will not be built 
unless investors expect to receive a 
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competitive return on their invest-
ment. Before a biodiesel plant can 
begin to pay out a return on invest-
ment, the plant must generate posi-
tive operating margins, which are 
defi ned as revenue minus all operat-
ing costs, including labor, energy, 
and feedstock costs. In 2007, most 
U.S. biodiesel plants found that they 
could not cover their operating ex-
penses. Thus, actual production in 
2007 at less than 500 million gallons 
was far less than the 1.85 billion gal-
lons in capacity.
Operating costs other than the 
cost of feedstock currently aver-
age approximately 59¢ per gallon. 
By-products of biodiesel production 
(glycerin, fatty acids, and fi lter cakes) 
provide revenues of perhaps 8¢ per 
gallon. Most U.S. biodiesel plants 
operate on soybean oil. It takes ap-
proximately 7.6 pounds of soybean 
oil to produce a gallon of biodiesel. 
The main source of revenue from 
biodiesel plants is, of course, biodie-
sel, which serves primarily as a 
substitute for diesel fuel. However, 
biodiesel is an excellent additive that 
increases the lubricity requirements 
for ultra-low-sulfur diesel. For any 
given biodiesel price, it is easy to 
estimate the soybean oil price above 
which operating margins become 
negative and biodiesel plants will 
not operate. Break-even soybean oil 
prices for different biodiesel prices 
are shown in Figure 1. 
Iowa biodiesel prices during 
the week ending January 11 aver-
aged $4.20 per gallon. Figure 1 
shows that at this price, the break-
even soybean oil price is 48¢ per 
pound. Actual soybean oil prices 
during this week averaged 48.5¢ 
per pound, which meant that plants 
that use soybean oil as a primary 
feedstock probably did not oper-
ate because they could not cover 
their operating costs. Figure 2 
shows that returns over operating 
costs have steadily eroded since 
Figure 1. Break-even soybean oil prices
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last spring, with the exception of a 
short-lived mid-August spike. With 
such low returns, it is not surpris-
ing that a large share of biodie-
sel capacity was idle in 2007. The 
National Biodiesel Board estimates 
that current biodiesel capacity is 
1.85 billion gallons, with another 
1.4 billion gallons of capacity in 
various stages of construction and 
planning. Actual fi scal year 2007 
production is likely to come in at 
around 400 million gallons. Note 
that the costs included in the es-
timated returns in Figure 2 do not 
include any returns to capital.
Impact of Excess Biodiesel 
Capacity
One implication of the large amount 
of excess capacity is that soybean 
oil prices will not be able to fall be-
low the break-even price shown in 
Figure 1 for any signifi cant amount 
of time. Prices below break-even 
levels will trigger increased biodie-
sel production, which will then 
result in prices being bid back up to 
break-even levels. Each billion gal-
lons of excess capacity represents 
7.6 billion pounds of soybean oil, or 
40 percent of total U.S. use in 2006. 
Clearly, increased capacity utiliza-
tion will have a large impact on soy-
bean oil prices. 
The overbuilding of the biodie-
sel industry thus promises low or 
zero returns to investors in biodie-
sel plants. Without the mandate, 
high feedstock prices will result in 
little or no production. Low feed-
stock prices will trigger production, 
but feedstock prices will conse-
quently be bid back up to break-
even levels that do not allow for a 
return on capital. Biodiesel plants 
integrated with soybean crushing 
facilities may enjoy some positive 
returns, especially when the price of 
soybean meal is high.
Implications of the New 
Renewable Fuels Standard
One of the big winners from pas-
sage of the EISA is thought to be the 
biodiesel industry because of the 
new mandate for one billion gallons 
by 2012. But the industry will only 
be a winner if the mandate leads to 
future industry profi ts. Profi ts will be 
realized only if the price of feedstock 
falls below the Figure 1 break-even 
levels, and that looks unlikely. Soy-
bean oil prices on the Chicago Board 
of Trade are currently between 50¢ 
and 55¢ per pound, which refl ects 
the market’s expectation that biodie-
sel production in the United States 
will grow to meet the new mandate 
and continue to put upward pres-
sure on prices. Figure 1 shows that 
biodiesel wholesale prices will need 
to be greater than $4.50 per gallon 
to generate enough revenue to cover 
such high feedstock prices. There are 
at least four ways that prices could 
rise to such a high level. The cur-
rent method of increasing biodiesel 
prices is a maximum $1.00-per-gallon 
tax credit given to diesel blenders 
who use biodiesel in their blends.
First, if wholesale diesel prices 
increase to $4.50 per gallon, then 
without a tax credit, biodiesel prices 
would also increase to this level 
because biodiesel is a good substi-
tute for diesel. But given the histori-
cal relationship between crude oil 
prices and diesel prices, the price 
of crude would have to increase to 
$155 per barrel before diesel prices 
would increase to $4.50 per gallon. 
Futures contracts for crude oil are 
currently below $100. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that market demand for 
biodiesel as a substitute for diesel 
will allow biodiesel producers to 
cover their costs.
Second, two sources of mar-
ket demand for biodiesel are the 
exports market and as a lubricity 
component in ultra-low-sulfur diesel 
blends. Just as the willingness to pay 
for ethanol as an octane enhancer 
and as an oxygenate is greater than 
the price of gasoline, the willingness 
to pay for biodiesel as a lubricity 
agent may be greater than the price 
of diesel. Tax breaks for biodiesel 
provided in other countries may 
have the same effect. There is some 
evidence that diesel blenders and 
exporters are willing to pay more for 
biodiesel than for diesel. In the fi rst 
week of January, the Iowa spot price 
of biodiesel was $4.15 per gallon. 
Subtracting the $1.00-per-gallon tax 
credit results in a market demand 
price of $3.15 per gallon. The spot 
Figure 2. Average returns over operating costs for an Iowa biodiesel plant
;
Source: Soybean oil and biodiesel weekly prices for Iowa from the Agricultural Marketing 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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price of Midwest diesel was approxi-
mately $2.80 per gallon, indicating 
a 35¢-per-gallon difference in the 
market demand price for biodiesel 
and diesel. However, to generate a 
market demand price of $4.50 per 
gallon for biodiesel with this level 
of market price premium would 
require crude oil prices of $140 per 
barrel. Exported quantities would 
not be counted toward the renew-
able fuels standard.
Third, the price of biodiesel 
could be increased to $4.50 per gal-
lon if the purchase of biodiesel by 
blenders were subsidized. The subsi-
dy would have to vary inversely with 
the price of diesel to ensure a $4.50 
biodiesel price. If blenders are willing 
to pay 35¢ more per gallon for biodie-
sel than for diesel, then the required 
variable tax credit would equal $4.15 
minus the wholesale price of diesel. 
The cost of meeting the biodiesel 
mandate using tax credits would be 
borne fully by taxpayers. 
Fourth, and lastly, biodiesel pric-
es could be increased enough to cov-
er feedstock costs if the government 
simply mandated that diesel blend-
ers use levels of biodiesel required 
by the EISA. Blenders would have to 
pay biodiesel producers a price high 
enough to allow the producers to 
stay in business to produce the re-
quired volumes. Blenders would then 
have to sell the blender product at 
whatever price they could induce die-
sel consumers to pay. The cost of the 
biodiesel mandate would be shared 
by consumers and blenders. 
Economic Impacts of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act
Passage of the EISA with a one-bil-
lion-gallon biodiesel mandate was 
meant to help a biodiesel industry 
that has been squeezed by low mar-
gins caused by spiraling feedstock 
costs that have outpaced biodiesel 
prices. The mandate will indeed in-
crease the price of biodiesel, either 
through higher subsidies to diesel 
blenders or because blenders are 
forced to pay biodiesel prices high 
enough to allow biodiesel produc-
ers to cover their feedstock costs. 
However, higher biodiesel prices do 
not automatically imply a profi table 
biodiesel industry. The capacity of 
the biodiesel industry will still be 
far in excess of that needed to meet 
the mandate. This excess capac-
ity means that biodiesel prices will 
need to be increased only enough to 
induce biodiesel producers to run 
their plants to produce the required 
amounts of biodiesel. That is, we 
should expect biodiesel prices to 
increase only enough to cover op-
eration costs. If this is the case, then 
owners of biodiesel plants should 
not expect to obtain much, if any, 
return on their invested capital.
This dismal outlook for the U.S. 
biodiesel industry hinges on feed-
stock prices always being bid to the 
industry’s break-even point. Prices 
cannot fall below this point as long 
as excess capacity exists. Prices 
cannot be bid above this point 
because demand for feedstock will 
drop as biodiesel plants stop operat-
ing. This new competitive environ-
ment is reinforced by increased 
biodiesel capacity in Europe, Brazil, 
and Argentina that has resulted 
from their mandates. Consequently, 
the ultimate benefi ciary of expand-
ed biodiesel mandates is not the 
biodiesel industry. Rather, farm-
ers and landowners should expect 
to see the lion’s share of benefi ts 
from these new mandates because 
feedstock prices will be maintained 
at levels that just keep the biodiesel 
industry afl oat. ◆
and 31.5 billion gallons, respectively. 
The long-run corn price is deter-
mined solely by ethanol producers’ 
ability to pay for corn in these two 
scenarios.
Cautionary Notes
Economists loathe making predic-
tions about where future prices are 
headed because they are so often 
wrong. The long-run predictions of 
corn prices given here are predicat-
ed on a number of key assumptions. 
When Will the Bubble Burst?
Continued from page 3
The fi rst is that current government 
biofuel mandates will be maintained 
despite opposition from an array 
of groups. The biodiesel mandates 
will increase the price of oilseeds, 
thus increasing competition for 
corn land, which results in the $4.00 
price of corn at 15 billion gallons of 
ethanol. If the biodiesel mandates 
are relaxed (but the ethanol man-
date is maintained), the long-run 
corn price will be lower. The second 
key assumption is that corn yields 
will continue to grow as they have in 
the past. If seed companies increase 
the rate of yield growth, then the 
corn supply curve will shift to the 
right in the graph. This shift will 
lower the long-run corn price if the 
ethanol mandate binds. However, 
if the mandate does not bind, then 
the shift simply means that the corn 
ethanol sector will grow even larger, 
leaving the long-run price of corn 
unchanged. Third, if the futures 
markets are completely wrong and 
crude oil prices drop signifi cantly, 
then $2.50 gasoline will just be a bad 
memory. However, because of the 
corn ethanol mandate, the price of 
corn will be determined by the man-
date, as in scenario 1. ◆ 
